Since then, attitude ambivalence has taken multiple forms in research psychology (see Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995 for a review) . By far, the two most commonly studied forms of ambivalence are known as "formula-based" and "subjective." Formulabased ambivalence (also known as "objective" or "formulaic") refers to the type of ambivalence which is measured by Kaplan-style items and then submitted to one of a variety of proposed formulas (see Ullrich, Schermelleh-Engel, & Böttcher, 2008) . This type of ambivalence does not ask directly about a sense of conflict -instead it is inferred through computations of the extent to which both positivity and negativity are present toward a particular attitude object. However, subjective ambivalence (also commonly referred to as "felt ambivalence"), is the extent to which people report feeling ambivalent. Subjective ambivalence is most commonly measured by asking questions about the extent to which one feels a sense of "torn feelings," or conflict within and/or between their thoughts and emotions. These two forms of ambivalence are moderately positively correlated (range of rs = .18 -.56; median = .37; Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; Costarelli & Polmonari, 2003; Dahl, Darke, Gorn, & Weinberg, 2005; DeMarree, Morrison, Wheeler, & Petty, 2011; Jonas, Diehl & Bromer, 1997; Newby-Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002; Riketta, 2004 as cited in Riketta & Ziegler, 2007) . To date, little research has attempted to disambiguate the concepts of subjective and formulaic ambivalence (see Albertson, Brehm, & Alvarez, 2004 for a discussion).
Consequences of Explicit Ambivalence
Throughout its history, theoretical innovations in the study of ambivalence have been greatly influenced by Festinger"s cognitive dissonance theory (1957) . Ambivalence, like cognitive dissonance, is assumed to bring about a state of tension and discomfort that people are motivated to reduce through attitude change. The first part of this assumption (i.e., tension and discomfort) has been supported in work showing that explicit ambivalence with regard to African-Americans is associated with more negative mood (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Monteith, 1996) and higher discomfort (Monteith, 1996) when race is made salient. Greater ambivalence in one"s feelings towards one"s own ingroup is likewise associated with increased discomfort (Costarelli, 2011) . In a particularly nice demonstration of this effect, Nordgren and colleagues (Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006) gave participants a sugar pill and told them that it would either make them feel relaxed or tense. They then exposed them to information about genetically modified food which was designed to induce ambivalence. Participants reported more negative feelings in the "relax pill" condition than the "tense pill" condition, arguably because participants could attribute the aversive feelings engendered by their ambivalence to the pill in the "tense" condition, but not in the "relax" condition.
The second part of the assumption -that people are motivated to reduce ambivalence by resolving it through attitude change -has been investigated using indicators of cognitive processing such as thought-listing and attention. Participants typically list more thoughts about explicitly ambivalent attitude objects than about explicitly univalent attitude objects (e.g., Nordgren et al., 2006) and these thoughts lead to attitude change for explicitly ambivalent participants (Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996) . In addition, ambivalent explicit attitudes lead people to be more attuned to the quality of the arguments they are presented with (Maio et al., 1996) and also to the content of the presented information (e.g., by both seeking out information that will decrease their ambivalence and avoiding information that has the potential to increase their ambivalence [Clark et al., 2008] ).
Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy
While much work has been done on elucidating the outcomes of ambivalence, this has almost all been done with self-reported attitude measures. However, depending on people"s ability to report the contents of their own minds may neglect many aspects of attitudes and evaluations that they hold, but do not report either because they are not aware of such contents or are unwilling to report them 1 . Implicit measures assess evaluative associations without requiring the respondent to introspect on their feelings (Nosek & Greenwald, 2009) , and often reveal evaluations that are distinct from selfreport . Evidence suggests that implicit and explicit evaluations are related, but distinct and each has unique predictive validity (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) . To the extent that these forms of evaluations are in conflict intra-psychically, it is possible that the consequences would be similar to experiencing ambivalence (Petty & Briñol, 2009 ).
It remains to be seen, however, whether theorizing about ambivalence within explicit attitudes is relevant for understanding discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes. It may be as simple as positing that implicit-explicit discrepancy is another form of ambivalence, in the same mold as the distinction between affect and cognition that is common in ambivalence research (e.g., Smith & Nosek, in press ). In that case, what has been learned about ambivalence will be very relevant for understanding the consequences of having discrepant implicit and explicit attitudes. Petty and Briñol (2009) recently raised this possibility in arguing that "people with implicit-explicit discrepancies should behave as if they are ambivalent" (p. 134). Some evidence shows that this may be true. For example, congruent implicit and explicit self-esteem has been shown to be related to a more stable sense of one"s self-esteem than has incongruent implicit and explicit self-esteem (Ziegler-Hill, 2006) . In addition, discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-concepts are related to increased attention to argument quality (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006) .These findings suggest that implicit and explicit attitude discrepancy operates like a form of ambivalence in that it is related to increased processing of information that has the potential to resolve the ambivalence. Petty and colleagues (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006 ) have proposed a model to understand the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes which they call the Prior Attitudes are Still There (PAST) model (a particular case of the Meta-Cognitive Model: Petty, 2006; . By their definition, implicit attitudes are attitudes that were formerly explicit attitudes but are not a person"s current explicit attitudes. They theorize that discrepancies between these older attitudes and newer attitudes should lead to ambivalence-like outcomes such as increased information processing and a greater sense of uncertainty with regard to one"s attitude.
However, the evidence linking implicit-explicit discrepancy to ambivalence remains light, and it remains possible that ambivalence -as it has heretofore been understood -is a phenomenon that is only consequential within relatively conscious, accessible (i.e., explicit) evaluations. In this case, discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations may be an entirely different phenomenon and the existing ambivalence theory and evidence may not be informative for understanding the behavioral outcomes associated with implicit-explicit discrepancy.
Theoretical Tests for Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy
We pursued two approaches to validate (or invalidate) implicit-explicit discrepancy as an indicator of ambivalence. The first approach was to examine its convergent validity with measures of explicit ambivalence, and the second was to test whether established consequences of explicit ambivalence also occur with implicitexplicit discrepancy. The first approach is realized through structural modeling of the relationship between implicit-explicit discrepancy and a variety of measures of explicit ambivalence across multiple topics. For the second approach, we use the most wellestablished consequences of ambivalence to test whether discrepant implicit and explicit attitudes have predictive validity similar to established measures of ambivalence:
1. Thinking about an attitude object about which one has discrepant attitudes will be aversive (Costarelli, 2011; Briñol et al., 2006; Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2006; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009 ) and will lead to a more negative generalized mood (Hass et al, 1992; Monteith, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006) . 2. Attitudes marked by implicit-explicit discrepancy will be held with less certainty and confidence (Bassili, 1996; Jonas et al., 1997; McGraw, Hasecke, & Conger, 2003; Ziegler-Hill, 2006) . Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2006 3. Increased processing of attitude-object relevant stimuli will be reported when implicit and explicit attitudes are discrepant Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2006) .
Study 1
In our initial test, we selected four attitude object pairs based on archival data from a database of 95 different topics (see Nosek & Hansen, 2008) . We selected four topics that differed substantially in terms of explicit ambivalence (i.e., two high and two low) and overlap of implicit-explicit evaluations (i.e., two high and two low) so that our conclusions would be more likely to be generalizable across the range of ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy. In addition, all four of the selected pairs of attitude object have been reported by previous participants as being relatively important. Participants were randomly assigned to complete several measures of attitude discrepancy for one of the following four attitude object pairs: Democrats vs. Republicans; Gay People vs. Straight People; Old People vs. Young People; and Poor People vs. Rich People. Additionally, a measure of mood was included to assess whether any of the ambivalence measures related to negative or positive feelings at the time of the study -an established consequence of explicit ambivalence (Hass et al, 1992; Monteith, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006) . indicate an automatic preference for Democrats relative to Republicans, Rich People relative to Poor People, Straight People relative to Gay People, and Young People relative to Old People. The IAT was scored following the recommendations of Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) ; error trials were retained with latencies continuing until a participant made a correct response, and latencies shorter than 400 milliseconds were deleted.
Explicit preference. Participants reported their relative preference for one attitude object relative to the other attitude object. For example, if a participant was randomly assigned to attitudes toward gay people and straight people they responded to the item "Which statement best describes you" using a 7-point scale anchored by "I strongly prefer gay people to straight people" and "I strongly prefer straight people to gay people." As with the IAT, positive numbers indicate a preference for Democrats relative to Republicans, Rich People relative to Poor People, Straight People relative to Gay People, and Young People relative to Old People. See online supplement for instructions that preceded the presentation of this and subsequent explicit items.
This self-report was combined with IAT scores to create an indicator of implicitexplicit discrepancy. First, IAT scores and self-reported attitudes were standardized by dividing each measure by its sample standard deviation. For both measures, the zero point indicated no preference for one category compared to the other. As such, the measures were not re-centered on the sample mean (which would assume that the average implicit and explicit attitude had the same meaning, even if they were in opposite directions) 2 . Finally, an absolute difference was calculated between the two standardized attitude scores. Higher numbers indicate greater discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes, while a zero indicates no discrepancy.
Subjective ambivalence. Participants reported the extent to which they experienced conflict in their attitudes using a 5-point scale anchored by "Not at all conflicted" and "Extremely conflicted." Participants randomly assigned to complete the study for attitude toward Old People and Young People, for example, responded to the item "How conflicted would you say your thoughts and feelings about Young People and Old People are?" (e.g., Clark et al., 2008; Costarelli & Polmonari, 2003; Dahl et al., 2005; de Liver, van der Pligt, &Wigboldus, 2007; Jonas et al., 1997; Newby-Clark et al., 2002) . Higher numbers indicate greater reported conflict.
Formulaic ambivalence. Participants separately reported the positivity and negativity of their attitudes. In particular, they responded to the items "Considering your positive feelings about the following and ignoring your negative feelings, how positive are your feelings?" with five response options from "not at all positive" to "extremely positive" and "Considering your negative feelings about the following and ignoring your positive feelings, how negative are your feelings?" with five response options from "not at all negative" to "extremely negative" (e.g., Clark et al., 2008; Costarelli & Polmonari, 2003; Dahl et al., 2005; de Liver et al., 2007; Jonas et al., 1997; Newby-Clark et al., 2002) . Higher numbers are indicative of greater positivity and greater negativity respectively. The positivity and negativity items were then used to construct an indicator of formulaic ambivalence by submitting the two reports to the following formula: ambivalence = (positive item + negative item)/2 -|positive item -negative item| + 2.0 (Thompson et al., 1995) . Scores of formulaic ambivalence range from 0 to 6 with higher scores indicating greater ambivalence. Because the study is about contrasted pairs of attitude objects, the two resulting ambivalence scores (e.g., one score for attitudes toward gay people and one score for attitudes toward straight people) were averaged.
Gut Reactions and Actual Feelings. Participants reported the positivity or negativity of their "Gut Reactions" and their "Actual Feelings" using a 6-point scale anchored by "very negative" and "very positive" (Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008) . Higher scores indicate more positivity toward each of the attitude objects. These reports were then used to construct gut/actual discrepancy scores by first calculating the absolute difference between Gut Reactions and Actual Feelings for one attitude object, and then calculating another difference score for the other attitude object. These two difference scores were then averaged. The resulting score (which ranges from 0 to 5) indicates the average amount of discrepancy between Gut Reactions and Actual Feelings, and ignores the direction of the discrepancy.
Affective and Cognitive attitudes. Participants used a 6-point scale anchored by "very negative" and "very positive" to report on the positivity and negativity of their "feelings and emotions" (i.e., affect) and their "thoughts and beliefs" (i.e., cognition) toward the attitude objects with higher scores indicating more positive affective and cognitive attitudes toward the attitude objects. Scores of affective-cognitive discrepancy were calculated in the same way as were scores of gut-actual discrepancy indicated above.
Mood. Participants reported their mood by responding to the item "In general, how would you say you are feeling right now?" using a 6-point scale anchored by "very negative" and "very positive." Higher scores indicate a more positive mood.
Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to complete the study for one of the four attitude objects. At the beginning of the study, participants were given the following instructions: "In the next few minutes, you will be asked to examine several different aspects of your evaluations of [attitude objects X and Y]. Please read each item carefully and take your time to think about your evaluations. Some of the questions may seem more natural to you than others, but please do your best to answer each question honestly and openly." In addition they were told that they would complete "a speeded sorting task" (i.e., the IAT). Whether they completed the IAT or the explicit items first was counterbalanced across participants. Within the set of explicit items, the order of measures was counterbalanced. After all implicit and explicit measures had been completed, participants reported their mood. Participants then received the results of their IAT and a debriefing page.
Analysis Strategy
Hypotheses were tested using model comparisons of confirmatory factor analyses. In confirmatory factor analysis, the experimenter uses existing theory to make decisions about relationships between manifest variables (measured during the study), and underlying latent variables (hypothesized, not measured). The theorized data structure is then compared to the observed data structure, and the resulting chi-square estimate provides information about the goodness-of-fit between the theorized structure and the data. In the present study, the proposed structure is that all of the ambivalence measures are indicators of a single latent "ambivalence" construct.
The current work examined the proposed factor structure by conducting hypothesis testing on a series of multiple-group models. The groups were the four attitude topics. In multiple-group models, groups can have the same or distinct factor structures. We expected that the ambivalence measures should relate similarly to one another, regardless of which attitude object is measured. This invariance would strengthen the conclusion that the findings from the study can be applied generally across topics. If, however, the measures have distinct factor structures depending on the attitude objects tested, then it suggests that the measures work differently depending on the topic and general conclusions will be equivocal. This can be formally tested by comparing the chisquare estimates of the overall goodness-of-fit between a model that constrains the factor loadings to be the same across the attitude topics, versus one that allows them to vary freely. If the constrained model does not produce a significant loss of fit, then one can conclude that the measures operate similarly across topics.
The assessment of each model"s fit is based on the chi-square estimate and the root-mean-square error of approximation index (RMSEA, or a ), a comparative assessment of the value of parsimony (simpler models) against the overall improvement of fit that usually accompanies the more complex representations. In other words, a assesses whether the improvement in model fit is worth the added complexity of the model. The rule-of-thumb for model fitting (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996) is that an a of <.05 is a "close" fit, .05-.08 is a "fair" fit, .08-.10 is a "mediocre" fit, and >.10 is a "poor" fit.
Results
Data from 24 IATs (5.7% of overall data) were dropped because of participants completing greater than 10% of trials in less than 300ms, having an overall error rate above 30%, or having an error rate above 40% for any one of the critical blocks.
Descriptive Statistics
Participants preferred 
Are Measures of Discrepancy Related?
We first tested whether the five indicators of attitude ambivalence/discrepancy could be interpreted as indicators of a single "ambivalence" construct. This model is conceptually equivalent to a confirmatory factor analysis in which the estimated parameter for the relationship of each discrepancy indicator with the latent construct is akin to a factor loading. The model was a good fit to the data, χ 2 (20) = 35.1, ε a = .044 3 suggesting that a single factor model is a reasonable representation of the data (See Table  1 ). This is the initial model (Model 1) against which specific hypotheses can be tested. First, can one conclude that the ambivalence/discrepancy measures operate similarly across attitude topics? And, second, is it reasonable to conclude that implicit-explicit discrepancy is an indicator of the "ambivalence" factor?
Are the Factor Loadings of Ambivalence Measures the Same Across Attitude Objects?
To answer the first question, constraints were introduced on the model. Comparing to Model 1, factorial invariance was tested by forcing the factor loadings for each of the five ambivalence indicators to be equal to one another across the four attitude objects 4 (see Table 2 for the unconstrained factor loadings in Model 1). To be clear, the researcher does not choose the values of these equal factor loadings, they are estimated as the best possible fit across the four attitude objects. If these constraints do not lead to a significantly worse model fit compared to the unconstrained model, then one can conclude that the measures of ambivalence/discrepancy are related in the same way across the four topics.
This constrained model (Model 2) was a good fit to the data, χ 2 (35) = 55.9, ε a = .039. In fact, the ε a fit indicator even improved slightly from the unconstrained Model 1 (ε a = .044). That suggests that the simpler model"s parsimony (Model 2) outweighs any overall fit improvements from the unconstrained model (Model 1). The formal test (change in chi-square relative to the change in degrees of freedom) confirmed that there was no significant difference between the two models (Δχ 2 /df = 1.4). Therefore, the added constraints are inconsequential (i.e., they do not meaningfully disturb the model fit) and should be preferred for parsimony. Model 2 was used as the baseline for subsequent tests.
Is Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy Related to Explicit Ambivalence Measures?
Although the model which uses all five measures as indicators of the latent construct is a good fit to the data, it is clear from examining the loading of the measure of implicit-explicit discrepancy (constrained loading = 0.01) that it is not related to the other indicators (constrained loading of affective-cognitive discrepancy = 0.38; formulaic ambivalence = 0.40; gut-actual discrepancy = 0.43; subjective ambivalence = 0.52). In order to test whether implicit-explicit discrepancy is related to the latent construct, we next fit a model in which the loading of implicit-explicit discrepancy to the ambivalence factor was set to zero. If setting that path to zero does not decrease model fit, then implicit-explicit discrepancy can be considered to be unrelated to attitude discrepancy as assessed by the four other measures of ambivalence.
When the indicator of implicit-explicit discrepancy was set to zero (Model 3a), the overall model fit was good (χ 2 = 55.9, df = 36, ε a = .039); in fact, the chi-square estimate of model misfit was the same as Model 2 which allowed the loading of the discrepancy measure to be freely estimated (Δχ 2 /df = 0.00). The fact that the model fits just as well whether the implicit-explicit indicator is estimated or set to zero suggests that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not at all related to the other measures. In contrast, when any of the other four measures" factor loading was set to zero (Models 3b to 3e), the model showed a significant loss of fit compared to Model 2 indicating that each of these measures are related to the latent construct (See Table 1 ).
Does Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy Predict Mood?
The question of whether implicit-explicit discrepancy is related to participants" mood was tested by examining a slightly modified model. In this case, the latent ambivalence factor was estimated without the indicator of implicit-explicit discrepancy as it was shown to be unrelated. Despite being unrelated to other ambivalence measures, implicit-explicit discrepancy may still measure a unique component of ambivalence and predict participant mood. As such, a path is estimated from the indicator of implicitexplicit discrepancy to mood as well as a path from the latent ambivalence construct to mood (See Figure) . This is equivalent to a simultaneous regression of ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy predicting mood. This model was a good fit to the data, χ 2 (54) = 75.9, ε a = .032. The path from the latent ambivalence factor to participant mood was estimated at β = -0.44 (p < .001), indicating that greater ambivalence was related to more negative moods. The path from implicit-explicit discrepancy, however, was not significant, β = 0.05, p = .54 indicating that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not related to participant mood.
Discussion
In Study 1, two methods of construct validation were followed. In the first, comparative structural equation modeling showed that although different methods of measuring explicit ambivalence were positively related, implicit-explicit discrepancy was unrelated to these measures (i.e., no "ambivalence" convergent validity). Importantly, showing factorial invariance across four diverse attitude objects implies that this conclusion is a relatively general one, as opposed to being specifically tied to any one attitude object. In addition, a second construct validation model assessed the extent to which explicit discrepancy and implicit-explicit discrepancy were related to a hallmark consequence of explicit ambivalence -mood. In this study, explicit discrepancy was predictive of a more negative mood, but implicit-explicit discrepancy was not (i.e., no "ambivalence" predictive validity).
As an aside, this study is the first to find that affective-cognitive discrepancy and discrepancy between gut reactions and actual feelings are related to negative mood. In addition, although negative mood is regularly argued to be a consequence of ambivalence, this study is one of the most comprehensive demonstrations of that finding to date.
In sum, a person who reports feeling conflicted about their attitudes toward (for example) gay people and straight people reports that conflict in multiple ways. They report that they have both strong positive and negative reactions toward gay and straight people, greater discrepancies in valence of their affective attitudes relative to their cognitive attitudes and of their gut reactions relative to their actual feelings. However, they do not have increased discrepancies between their implicit and explicit evaluations. The presence or absence of those discrepancies is independent of reported feelings of conflict.
It is important to note that none of the explicit measures of ambivalence was very highly related to the latent construct (median standardized loading of the four measures across the four topics = 0.42) indicating that each ambivalence measure retains some unique qualities. One task for future research will be to develop theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the potentially independent components of ambivalence across these operationalizations.
Study 2
Declaring that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not a measure of ambivalence is a significant departure from existing treatments of the concept (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2009 ). As such, in Study 2, we investigated whether the lack of convergent validity and lack of predictive validity for mood from Study 1 also occurs using the most commonly studied construct in implicit-explicit discrepancy -self-esteem. Therefore, Study 2 followed the same methodology of Study 1, but assessed implicit and explicit self-esteem.
Method

Participants
The sample was restricted to citizens of the United States. One hundred and eighty-five visitors to the Project Implicit research site completed the study. Of these, 67% were women and the mean age was 33.6 (SD = 12.9). Additionally, 62.4% of participants reported being White, 13.9% African American, 10.2% Multiracial, 7.6% "Other or Unknown", and 5.9% Asian.
Materials
Participants completed a self-esteem IAT (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) conducted and scored following the same procedure outlined in Study 1. Additionally, participants completed measures of explicit preference, subjective ambivalence, formulaic ambivalence, gut reactions, actual feelings, affective attitudes, cognitive attitudes with the same instructions and items used in Study 1. Positive scores on all attitude measures indicate an automatic preference for Self relative to Other People. Discrepancy scores were calculated in the same way as in Study 1 (independently standardizing implicit and explicit attitudes [as operationalized by the explicit preference item] by dividing by the measure"s standard deviation, and taking an absolute difference between the two standardized scores). Participants also reported their mood as in Study 1. Additionally, we attempted to cast a wider net for potential outcomes of implicit-explicit discrepancy by including self-reported amount of thinking about the attitude object, which has previously been shown to be related to explicit ambivalence (e.g., Nordgren et al., 2006) .
Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 followed that of Study 1 with the attitude object being self-esteem.
Results
Data from 12 IAT scores (6.5% of overall data) were dropped because of participants completing greater than 10% of trials in less than 300ms, having an overall error rate above 30%, or having an error rate above 40% for any one of the critical blocks. 15, p = .042), consistent with prior demonstrations (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Petty & Briñol, 2009) .
Is implicit-explicit discrepancy about self-esteem related to the other ambivalence measures?
To understand whether ambivalence measures in self-esteem were related, the same model from Study 1 was fit to this data (except that it was not a multiple-groups model as there was only one attitude object). When all five measures of discrepancy were loaded onto a single latent factor, the model fit was acceptable but not a close fit, χ 2 (5) = 10.5, ε a = .080.
As observed in Study 1, the measure of implicit-explicit discrepancy in Study 2 was unrelated to the latent discrepancy construct (β = .002, p = .98) whereas each of the indicators of explicit ambivalence/discrepancy were related to the discrepancy construct (formulaic ambivalence β = .43; subjective ambivalence β = 0.77; gut-actual discrepancy β = 0.41; affective-cognitive discrepancy β = 0.49, all ps < .001). A model setting the implicit-explicit discrepancy loading to zero fit the data as well as did Model 1 (χ 2 (6) = 10.5, ε a = .067) despite the added constraint. This indicates that, as in Study 1, implicitexplicit discrepancy is not related to the common factor of the other ambivalence measures. And, as in Study 1, setting any of the other ambivalence measure loadings to zero led to a significant decrement in model fit (See Table 3 , models 2b-2e) indicating that they all contribute meaningfully to the underlying construct.
Is Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy Related to Mood or Self-focused Thoughts? When both the latent factor of ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy was used to predict participants" mood, the model was a good fit to the data, χ 2 (9) = 12.3, ε a = .046. The parameter estimate of the path from the latent discrepancy factor to mood was estimated at β = -0.35, p < .001, indicating that increased ambivalence was again significantly related to negative mood. As in Study 1, implicit-explicit discrepancy was not significantly related to mood (β = -0.04, p = .56). In Study 2, participants also reported the extent to which they think about themselves. When both the latent factor of ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy was used to predict participants" selfthinking, the model was a good fit to the data, χ 2 (9) = 11.6, ε a = .041. The parameter estimate of the path from the latent discrepancy factor to self-thinking was estimated at β = 0.25, p = .012, indicating that increased ambivalence was significantly related to more self-thinking. However, implicit-explicit discrepancy was not significantly related to selfthinking (β = -0.15, p = .12).
Discussion
Study 2, like Study 1, showed that the four measures of explicit ambivalence are related to each other but not to implicit-explicit discrepancy. And, again, greater explicit ambivalence was related to less positive mood, whereas implicit-explicit discrepancy was not. Additionally, explicit ambivalence was related to greater self-thinking, while implicit-explicit discrepancy was not. Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 show that implicitexplicit discrepancy has no convergent validity with other ambivalence measures and does not predict a "standard" consequence of ambivalence -mood state.
Study 3
For Study 3, we tested whether these findings were particular to our chosen implicit measure, the IAT. We used evaluative priming (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986 ) and conducted two distinct data collections that parallel Studies 1 and 2 (with two attitude topics -gay-straight attitudes, and self-esteem) but with additional outcome variables that should be predicted by ambivalence. For economy of prose, we report them here as a single study.
Method Participants
Gay-straight study: 732 visitors to the Project Implicit research site completed the study with regard to gay-straight attitudes. Of these, 69.6% were women and the mean age was 29.0 (SD = 11.5). Additionally, 71.5% of participants reported being White, 8.4% African American, 7.6% Multiracial, 6.4% Asian, and 6.1% Other or Unknown.
Self-esteem study: 623 visitors to the Project Implicit research site completed the study with regard to self-esteem. Of these, 66.6% were women and the mean age was 29.5 (SD = 11.8). Additionally, 76% of participants reported being White, 6.6% Asian, 6.1% African American, 5.8% Other or Unknown, and 5.5% Multiracial.
Materials
Explicit preference and discrepancy measures. All measures of explicit preference and discrepancy are identical to those used in Study 1 and Study 2. As in those studies, higher scores indicate a preference for self compared to other people and for straight people compared to gay people.
Evaluative priming. In the evaluative priming (EP) task, participants were told that words in green and white fonts would appear on the screen. They were instructed to ignore the words in white and evaluate words in green as being good or bad using the "E" and "I" keys. A single trial consisted of a prime presented in white font for 200ms, a postprime pause of 50ms, and the presentation of a target word in green font for 1500ms. Participants completed 180 trials separated into three blocks of 60 by a screen reminding them to continue to ignore the white words while categorizing the green words as being good or bad. For participants completing the self-esteem measures, the primes were Self, Me, I, Myself, Other, They, Them, and Theirs. For participants completing the sexual orientation measures, the primes were Gay, Homosexual, Gay People, Straight, Heterosexual, and Straight People. Whether participants sorted good words to the left and bad words on the right or vice was counterbalanced across participants. The task was scored by first separating the data into the four trial types (i.e., gay + good, gay + bad, straight + good, straight + bad). Error trials and trials completed in less than 300ms were then deleted. Raw latencies were used to calculate means and standard deviations for each participant for each of the four types of trials. These were used to delete any trials that were completed more than 2.5 SD away from a participant"s mean response latency. Latencies were then log transformed and difference scores were constructed by subtracting the difference in positivity and negativity toward gay people (or other people) from the difference in positivity and negativity toward straight people (or the self). In this way, positive scores indicate an implicit preference for oneself relative to other people and for straight people relative to gay people.
Outcome measures. Participants responded to the same mood item from the previous two studies; higher scores indicate more positive mood. In addition, they rated whether their mood had changed over the course of the study: "Would you say your mood has gotten better or worse since starting the study?" with a 7-point scale ranging from "much worse" to "much better"; higher scores indicate a more positive mood changes. Participants used a 6-point scale to respond to each of the following five questions: (1) "How often do you find yourself thinking about issues surrounding sexual orientation?"; (2) "People can be certain or uncertain about their feelings for different things. How certain are you about your feelings about gay people?"; (3) "Some people are very confident about their feelings, and others are less confident. How confidently do you hold your attitudes toward gay people?"; (4) "How comfortable do you feel talking about your feelings and thoughts about gay people?"; (5) "How likely do you think it is that your feelings and thoughts about gay people will change over time?" Higher scores indicate more thinking, certainty, confidence, comfort, and change, respectively. For participants who completed the study with regard to self-esteem attitudes, the previous five questions used the same wording, with the word "yourself" inserted for "gay people" or "sexual orientation" (e.g., "How likely do you think it is that your feelings and thoughts about yourself will change over time?").
Procedure
The procedure for Study 3 followed that of Study 1 and Study 2 with the implicit measure being an evaluative priming task and the addition of several outcome measures. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the study with the attitude object being self-esteem or sexual orientation attitudes. As in Study 1 and Study 2, participants completed a measure of their mood. The current study added self-report measures of change in mood across the course of the study session, attitude certainty, attitude confidence, future attitude change, comfort level with the attitude object, and amount of thinking about the attitude object. The new outcome measures were always presented first, followed by implicit and explicit attitude measures (presented in a counter-balanced order). Questions about mood and change in mood were always presented at the end of the study.
Results
For the EP tasks, a trial was deleted if it was an incorrect response, was completed in less than 300ms, or was more than 2.5 SD faster or slower than an individual"s mean response latency. Data from participants having > 40% of their trials missing as a result of these deletions were dropped from the data set. This left 704 participants in the gay/straight study (3.8% of overall data was dropped) and 608 participants in the selfesteem study (2.4% of overall data was dropped) = 0.53, p < .0001). Implicit and explicit attitudes were not related to one another for selfesteem (r = .01, p = .85) and were reliably, but weakly correlated for sexual orientation attitudes (r = .09, p = .019).
Is implicit-explicit discrepancy related to the other ambivalence measures?
To understand whether ambivalence measures were related, the same model from Study 2 was fit to the data separately for participants who completed the study with regard to self-esteem and sexual orientation attitudes. The results for self-esteem closely replicate those of Study 2 (See Table 4 ). In particular, when all five measures of ambivalence were loaded onto a single latent factor, the model fit was "fair", χ 2 (5) = 25.5, ε a = .082. Importantly, the loading of the measure of implicit-explicit discrepancy did not load significantly onto the latent discrepancy construct (β = -0.04, p = .51), whereas each of the indicators of explicit ambivalence were related to the ambivalence construct (formulaic ambivalence β = 0.37; subjective ambivalence β = 0.54; gut-actual discrepancy β = 0.53; affective-cognitive discrepancy β = 0.51, all ps < .001). Furthermore, as in the previous studies, when the indicator of implicit-explicit discrepancy was set to zero (Model 2a), the overall model fit was good (χ 2 = 25.9, df = 6, ε a = .074). In fact, the chi-square estimate of model misfit was no different than Model 1 which allowed the loading of the discrepancy measure to be freely estimated (Δχ 2 /df = 0.04). Again, the observation that the model fits equally satisfactorily when the implicitexplicit indicator is set to zero as when it is freely estimated suggests that implicitexplicit discrepancy is not at all related to the other measures. However, when any of the other four measures" factor loading was set to zero (Models 2b to 2e), the model showed a significant loss of fit compared to Model 1 (all Δχ 2 /df > 40.2; all ε a > .128) which indicates that each of these measures are meaningfully related to the latent construct. This suggests that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not meaningfully related to explicit discrepancy for attitudes toward oneself.
With regard to sexual orientation attitudes, the pattern of results is slightly more equivocal. In this case, a single factor model including the measure of implicit-explicit discrepancy was a close fit to the data, χ 2 (5) = 9.7, ε a = .037 and, for the first time, implicit-explicit discrepancy was significantly related to the latent discrepancy construct (β = 0.13, p = .009). However, each of the indicators of explicit ambivalence/discrepancy were much more strongly related to the discrepancy construct (formulaic ambivalence β = 0.40; subjective ambivalence β = 0.53; gut-actual discrepancy β = 0.58; affectivecognitive discrepancy β = 0.51, all ps < .001). Setting the indicator of implicit-explicit discrepancy to zero (Model 2a) does lead to a significant decrease in model fit (Δχ 2 /df = 6.7), the model is still a good fit (χ 2 = 16.4, df = 6, ε a = .050). In contrast, setting each of the other four indicators of ambivalence to zero results in significant increases in model mis-fit (all Δχ 2 /df > 65.9) and none of the resulting models are considered acceptable (all ε a > .128).
Is Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy Related to Mood?
Replicating the pattern of results in Study 1 and Study 2, when both the latent factor of discrepancy and implicit-explicit discrepancy was used to predict participants" mood, the model was a fair fit to both the self-esteem data, χ 2 (9) = 41.6, ε a = .077, and the sexual orientation attitudes data, χ 2 (9) = 29.6, ε a = .057. For self-esteem, the parameter estimate of the path from the latent discrepancy factor to mood was estimated at β = -.38, p < .001, indicating that increased discrepancy was again significantly related to negative mood. As in Study 2, implicit-explicit discrepancy in self-esteem was not significantly related to mood (β = -.03, p = .38). Likewise for sexual orientation attitudes, the parameter estimate of the path from the latent discrepancy factor to mood was estimated at β = -.22, p < .001, indicating that increased discrepancy was again significantly related to negative mood. As in Study 1, implicit-explicit discrepancy was not significantly related to mood (β = .06, p = .11). So, although in this study, implicitexplicit discrepancy was related to the ambivalence latent construct in one of the two data collections, it did not show evidence of predictive validity for general mood state in either sets of data.
Is Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy Related to Other Outcomes?
We included several other potential outcomes in an attempt to test a fuller potential range of outcomes of implicit-explicit discrepancy. Each outcome was tested using the same model as outlined above for mood, but inserting the relevant outcome in the place of mood. For self-esteem, increases in the explicit ambivalence/discrepancy score significantly predicted decreased attitude certainty (β = -.41, p < .001), decreased confidence in their attitude about themselves (β = -.41, p < .001), decreased comfort talking about their thoughts and feelings about themselves (β = -.21, p < .001), increased expectations of future attitude change (β = .21, p < .001), more negative mood across the course of the study session (β = -.24, p < .001), and greater self-reported thinking about oneself (β = .33, p < .001). Implicit-explicit discrepancy was not related to any of these outcomes (-.04 < all β < .02; all ps > .31). For sexual orientation attitudes, increases in the explicit ambivalence/discrepancy score significantly predicted decreased attitude certainty (β = -.52, p < .001), decreased confidence in their attitudes about gay people (β = -.43, p < .001), decreased comfort talking about their thoughts and feelings about gay people (β = -.38, p < .001), increased expectations of future attitude change (β = .44, p < .001), and more negative mood across the course of the study session (β = -.15, p = .003), although it did not predict increased thinking about gay people (β = .02, p = .74). Implicit-explicit discrepancy was also related to decreased comfort (β = -.10, p = .006), but was not related to any of the other five factors (-.06 < all β < .06; all ps > .09).
Discussion
This study replicates the findings of the previous two studies using a different measure of implicit attitudes, albeit with a couple wrinkles. In this study, for sexual orientation attitudes, implicit-explicit discrepancy was related enough to measures of explicit discrepancy to load successfully onto the latent discrepancy factor, though quite weakly. This was not true for self-esteem. Additionally, higher implicit-explicit discrepancy was related to one of seven outcome variables for sexual orientation attitudes and none of the seven outcome variables for self-esteem.
In total, across the three studies, there were seven occasions for implicit-explicit discrepancies to correlate with the other ambivalence measures, and one of those was significant and weak. Likewise, there were twenty occasions for implicit-explicit discrepancies to predict outcome variables and one was statistically significant and weak (whereas the other ambivalence measures were significant predictors in 19 out of 20 occasions). This pattern of relations suggests Type I error. Notably, these relations were tested with very high power designs. Even quite small effects could have been detected reliably.
The results of this study, in combination with the first two, strongly suggest that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not a measure of ambivalence as the construct has been understood to date.
General Discussion
The consequences of holding conflicting attitudes have long been of interest to humans (including human researchers of psychology). We evaluated whether attitude ambivalence was related to implicit-explicit discrepancy, in terms of convergent validity and parallel predictive validity. Across three studies, five topics, and two implicit measures, the consistent result is that implicit-explicit discrepancy does not relate to other ambivalence measures, nor predict outcomes that ambivalence theories anticipate. We conclude that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not the same thing as ambivalence as it is currently understood.
Convergent validity evidence.
Each study included the most commonly-utilized measures of explicit ambivalence -formulaic ambivalence and subjective ambivalence. In addition, the studies included new measures of ambivalence (affective-cognitive and gut-actual) that showed convergent and predictive validity for ambivalence. This is an important addition because these self-report measures are more similar to implicit measures than other self-report assessments (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Ranganath et al., 2008; Smith & Nosek, in press ). Using the convergent validity approach, all three studies showed evidence that implicit-explicit discrepancy was not related to measures of explicit ambivalence. In Study 3, implicit-explicit discrepancy with regard to sexual orientation evaluations was related enough to the other measures of ambivalence to load onto a single factor. However, (1) as this relationship was a weak one in the context of a highpowered design, (2) setting the factor loading to zero still led to an acceptable model fit, the evidence lays much more strongly on the side of non-convergence, and (3) as noted next, implicit-explicit discrepancy did not predict six of the seven outcome criteria.
Predictive/criterion validity evidence. In each study, at least one established consequences of explicit ambivalence (i.e., mood, thinking, confidence) was measured to assess whether implicit-explicit discrepancy was predictive of these hallmark consequences of explicit ambivalence. In all three studies, greater explicit ambivalence was related to more negative mood, but implicit-explicit discrepancy was not. In Study 2 and Study 3, ambivalence was also related to amount of thinking, while implicit-explicit discrepancy was not. Finally, in Study 3, more explicit ambivalence also predicted more negative mood change across the course of the study session, decreased certainty, decreased confidence, decreased comfort, and increased expectations of future attitude change. Implicit-explicit discrepancy showed a significant but weak positive relationship with thinking about sexual orientation attitudes (though this relationship was not observed for attitudes about the self). Therefore, the second validation strategy led to the same conclusion as the first -implicit-explicit discrepancy is distinct from explicit ambivalence.
These three investigations (including seven samples, five attitude objects, and two measures of implicit evaluations) gave implicit-explicit discrepancy a very good opportunity to show a relationship to explicit ambivalence by using large samples, multiple measures of explicit ambivalence, multiple measures of implicit attitudes, diverse attitude topics, and several outcome criteria. However, implicit-explicit discrepancy showed neither convergent validity with explicit measures of ambivalence (save one time, weakly), nor consistent predictive validity of the consequences of explicit ambivalence (while explicit ambivalence did predict these consequences).
We conclude that implicit-explicit discrepancy is not a measure of ambivalence. This conclusion must be tempered by the possibility that implicit-explicit discrepancy was not measured appropriately in the current set of studies. However, our calculation of the difference between standardized estimates of implicit and explicit attitudes is a common way of operationalizing the construct in the research on intrapsychic conflict (e.g., Briñol, Petty, & See, 2008 as cited in Petty & Briñol, 2009; Briñol et al., 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2009; Rydell et al., 2006) . The findings and conclusion lead to two obvious questions: (1) if implicit-explicit discrepancy shows no convergent or predictive validity in these studies, is it a valid indicator of anything?, and (2) if implicit-explicit discrepancy is a valid indicator of some form of attitude conflict, what is it, and why is it distinct from explicit ambivalence?
Is implicit-explicit discrepancy valid?
Despite the present litany of null effects for implicit-explicit discrepancy, prior research supports the validity of the implicit-explicit discrepancy construct. For example, discrepancy in implicit-explicit attitudes has been shown to be related to increased attention to argument quality (Briñol et al., 2008 as cited in Petty & Briñol, 2009 Briñol et al., 2006) , increased implicit self-doubt (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2003 as cited in Petty & Briñol, 2009 , increased discomfort -as operationalized by self-touching (Olson & Fazio, 2007) , and increased discrimination against Asians (Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Grunfeld, Robichaud, & Zanna, 2005) . In addition, discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem have been shown to be related to outgroup derogation (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005; Kernis, Abend, Goldman, Shrira, Paradise, & Hampton, 2005) , narcissism (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) , self-promotion behavior (Kernis et al., 2005) , defensive behavior (Jordan et al., 2003) , and negative health outcomes (Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, & Schütz, 2007) . This list suggests that implicit-explicit discrepancies are meaningful.
At the same time, there is evidence for non-relationships where they might otherwise be hypothesized based on ambivalence theories. For example, a meta-analysis finds that narcissism is not predicted by the interaction between explicit self-esteem and implicit self-esteem as measured by the IAT, although they do report a significant interaction using the Name Letter Task which they refer to as "weak but significant" (p. 1423; Bosson, Lakey, Campbell, Zeigler-Hill, Jordan, & Kernis, 2008) . In summary, while intrapersonal discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations may be impactful on cognition and behavior, our studies suggest that the explanation for that impact may distinct from the existing conceptualizations of ambivalence.
Why is implicit-explicit discrepancy distinct from ambivalence?
It is possible that the analytic strategy for determining implicit-explicit discrepancy plays a significant role in the identity and validity of the construct. In the present studies, we standardized implicit and explicit attitudes by dividing each type of attitude by the measure"s standard deviation. This put both measures on a "scale free" metric with the scaling deriving from the variability in the sample. In addition, we retained the zero point of both measures because it is presumed to indicate "no preference" between the attitude object pairs (e.g., no faster to associate gay people + bad and straight people + good relative to the opposite pairings on the IAT; a self-reported attitude of "no preference between gay people and straight people"). This approach assumes that the zero points do indeed indicate no preference, and that the variability in each measure has the same interpretation (i.e., a 1 standard deviation increase in IAT score is the "same amount" of stronger preference for X over Y as a 1 standard deviation increase in explicit preference rating).
An alternate method would be to drop the rational zero assumption by dividing by standard deviations after subtracting the group"s mean from each score. This re-centers each individual score on the average score of the people with whom they happen to have been sampled. By centering on the measure"s mean, this approach makes a new assumption that the means of each measure have the same interpretation. It also makes the discrepancy scores "sample dependent." For example, a person with a 0.20 IAT Dscore would have a different recentered score if the group mean is 0.50 as compared to 0.10 (and could therefore show no discrepancy in one case and a strong discrepancy in the other).
A third form of calculating discrepancy ignores the particulars of the measure completely and instead separately rank orders each individual"s implicit attitude and explicit attitude within the sample and operationalizes discrepancy as the absolute difference of these two rankings (Briñol et al., 2008 as cited in Petty & Briñol, 2009 . While this has the advantage of avoiding the issue of whether to center on the mean, it still makes the calculation of intra-psychic conflict dependent on characteristics of the sample. Ideally, an individual"s implicit-explicit discrepancy would be calculated without needing any reference to the scores of others. However, much more needs to be known about the metrics of implicit and explicit attitude measures and how to compare them before such a method is feasible.
Many studies on discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes or selfesteem have tested interactions between implicit and explicit attitudes in predicting outcomes. In this strategy, the interaction term functions as the measure of discrepancy. Of course, just like the statistical debate about whether to calculate longitudinal change scores as the difference between Time 1 and Time 2, or to model the main effects and interaction of Time 1 and Time 2 variables, this strategy carries its own statistical assumptions that may or may not apply to the data and the construct. We additionally tested whether the interaction between implicit and explicit evaluations predicted each of the outcomes in the three studies using 20 separate simultaneous regressions (after meancentering both predictors). None of the interaction terms reached significant, excepting that self-reported future attitude change with regard to gay and straight people was predicted by the interaction between explicit evaluations and EP scores. Ironically perhaps, having one in 20 significance tests reach significance is the standard criteria for Type I error.
Comparing the relative merits of these various ways of operationalizing discrepancy is outside the bounds of the current work, but this discussion points out that understanding the assumptions of each analysis strategy and its implications for validating the construct of implicit-explicit discrepancy is critical for any comprehensive examination of this question. In any case, as there is currently no evidence to clarify which form of calculating implicit-discrepancy is most appropriate nor their specific relations, our conclusions must, for now, be considered specific to the forms of discrepancy used.
In addition to the analytic reasons why implicit-explicit discrepancy may not be equivalent to ambivalence, there may be a qualitative difference between implicit-explicit discrepancy and ambivalence in terms of subjective awareness of the discrepancy. In particular, awareness of the discrepant attitudes may be a necessary component of ambivalence.
This relevance of awareness of implicit and explicit attitudes on the effects of implicit-explicit discrepancy was presaged by discussions of ambivalence versus dual attitudes in Wilson and colleagues" (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) model of dual attitudes. In their view, implicit-explicit discrepancy would only be aversive (and thereby, perhaps, consequential) to the extent that participants were aware of their implicit and explicit evaluations and deemed both of them as legitimate (see Petty & Briñol, 2009 for a related argument). Otherwise, the two evaluations can co-exist and each will be predictive of outcomes (based on a person"s motivation and cognitive ability to use their explicit attitude), but the discrepancy will not be predictive in and of itself.
Whether people are (or can be) aware of the associations measured by implicit measures is a question that has been enjoying considerable research attention in recent years (e.g., Conrey & Smith, 2007; Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Ranganath, et al., 2008; Smith & Nosek, in press ). If experiences related to implicit attitudes reach awareness, it seems that they are experienced as "gut reactions." Because it is easy to disavow gutlevel reactions (e.g., by labeling them as "not mine"), discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes could be argued to be less likely to give rise to the aversive sense of conflict that may be a necessary precursor of ambivalence-like consequences (see Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001 for a similar argument with regard to explicit ambivalence). The relationship between awareness of implicit-explicit discrepancies, feelings of tension, and behavioral outcomes may turn out to be an interesting area of exploration. For example, we think it is likely that a subjective sense of tension plays a mediating role in the effects that explicit ambivalence has on behavior. Participants in the present studies did not report feeling a sense of conflict in relationship to their implicitexplicit discrepancy, which may begin to explain why there was no consistent relationships between this type of discrepancy and the outcomes that were associated with explicit ambivalence/discrepancy (which they did report as being related to tension). However, it seems likely that situations could be created in which participants experience a gut reaction that conflicts with their endorsed beliefs and yet they take seriously as consequential (e.g., Huntsinger, 2011) . In such circumstances, the effects of implicitexplicit discrepancies could suddenly start to look similar to those of explicit ambivalence, despite the evidence of the present studies to the contrary. Identifying those circumstances may reconcile the divide between the present results and the published reports showing effects of implicit-explicit discrepancy that are consistent with theories of ambivalence.
Conclusion
Humans are confirmation seekers.
Attending to "what something is" is much more satisfying than "what something is not." And yet, in construct validation, these two carry equal weight. The nature and value of a construct can only be understood by understanding both its convergent validity -answering what is part of the construct -and its discriminant validity -answering what is not part of the construct. In the present studies, we found clear evidence that the prevailing understanding of what implicitexplicit discrepancy is, in fact, is actually what implicit-explicit discrepancy is not. Explicit ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy are two different things. They are not related, but distinct; the present results suggest that they are entirely unrelated. The existing literature shows that both can predict behavior, and there is a mature body of theory for explaining how ambivalence does so. But the present evidence implies that this theory will not apply to implicit-explicit discrepancies. The pressing next question is to generate a novel theoretical framework for understanding the uniqueness between implicit-explicit discrepancy and ambivalence and its consequences for human behavior.
1 Petty and Briñol (2009) refer to a situation wherein a person is unable to report on their attitude ambivalence (because they aren"t aware of it) or unwilling to do so (because they deny either the positivity or the negativity as being indicative of their true attitude) as "implicit ambivalence" (see also . This is probably due to their reliance on the "lack of awareness" aspect which is associated with automaticity (see Bargh, 1994) . While the arguments they make are very much in line with the current work, the use of the term "implicit ambivalence" threatens to lead to some conceptual confusion. In the current work we use the word preceding ambivalence to refer to what type of measurement the ambivalence resides in rather than using the terms to refer to aspects of the evaluations themselves. More specifically, "explicit ambivalence" refers to ambivalence within explicit attitudes, "implicit ambivalence" refers to ambivalence within implicit attitudes, and "implicit/explicit discrepancy" refers to discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes. Note. ε a = root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) for each model. The model in which factor loadings are constrained is compared to the unconstrained model. Each of the five models in which the loadings of one of the indicators is set to zero is then compared to the constrained model. Note. Each of the five models in which the loadings of one of the indicators is set to zero is compared to the single-factor model.
Implicit-explicit discrepancy 34 Note. Each of the five models in which the loadings of one of the indicators is set to zero is compared to the single-factor model.
Figure.
Representation of structural equation model simultaneously predicting criterion variable from Explicit Ambivalence factor and Implicit-Explicit Discrepancy factor. Squares represent measured variables, circles represent latent factors.
